De vraag is en blijft waarom de tipgever een link kan maken tussen Zweden, de bende, huurlingen en andere. Hij is ook op de hoogte van een moordonderzoek; Mendez?

Er is nog een interessant element in het gegeven:

the end wrote:

To assist them in their smuggling operations, Bofors used a front, named Karl-Erik Schmitz. This “Bobbo” Schmitz had started his gigantic gunpowder dealings in South Africa where his family business was located. Of the annual consumption of 4,700 tons ordered by Iran from Schmitz, 3,000 tons were supplied by South African Armscor, the remainder he obtained from Bofors. This key figure in the European branch of Irangate had contacts with both South-Africa and the smuggling network of Oliver North. One of the companies utilized by him was Belgian PRB, on the board of which was Social Democrat politician, André Cools, who was later murdered.

Is het toeval dat er een Zweedse tipgever is begin '86 en '88?

De waarheid schaadt nooit een zaak die rechtvaardig is.

Meer over 'Bobbo' Schmitz » www.larouchepub.com (PDF)

België, de haven van Zeebrugge en de luchthaven van Lille zijn belangrijk. Raar dat Oostende er niet in voorkomt? Ook is de figuur Erik Penser op de achtergrond met PRB belangrijk. Die Erik Penser verbleef in Belgie en had hier zijn kantoren. Hij is in feite de grote man in het Zweeds stuk.

Een heel interessant artikel is dit » leiden.courant.nu

Ook nog Iran-gate:

Belgium closes its eyes

One of the most helpful European nations for the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force was Belgium, which sent aircraft mechanics capable of jerryrigging broken fighters and disused radar systems, US officials said. The Belgians also overhauled F-4 engines sent to Brussels via commercial carrier on a regular basis (17).mechanics capable of jerryrigging broken fighters and disused radar systems, US officials said. The Belgians also overhauled F-4 engines sent to Brussels via commercial carrier on a regular basis (17).

Lax Customs regulations turned Belgium into one of the major transshipment points for Iranian arms purchases. The port of Zeebrugge was used for years to transfer weapons from Sweden and France to Iran. And evidence now suggests that a major smuggling operation involving TOW missiles from NATO stockpiles in the US and Europe was conducted inside the sealed Customs zone of Brussels' Zaventem International Airport starting in mid-1985.

Intelligence sources in France and West Germany say that NATO Commander-in-Chief Bernard Rogers ordered an internal investigation late in 1986 into reports that TOW missiles from NATO warehouses in Germany - and perhaps other military equipment - had been diverted to Iran in 1985-86. Rogers was "furious to learn that NATO weapons were being sold to Iran without his knowledge," they said. A US spokesman at Supreme Headquarters-Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, replied in February 1987 that the investigation was "a political issue," and that "the Pentagon has ordered us not to comment on it." The Reagan Administration relieved Rogers of his command only weeks after he began his investigation.

During his six years as NATO commander, Rogers had been extremely popular with Europeans.West Germany say that NATO Commander-in-Chief Bernard Rogers ordered an internal investigation late in 1986 into reports that TOW missiles from NATO warehouses in Germany - and perhaps other military equipment - had been diverted to Iran in 1985-86. Rogers was "furious to learn that NATO weapons were being sold to Iran without his knowledge," they said. A US spokesman at Supreme Headquarters-Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, replied in February 1987 that the investigation was "a political issue," and that "the Pentagon has ordered us not to comment on it." The Reagan Administration relieved Rogers of his command only weeks after he began his investigation. During his six years as NATO commander, Rogers had been extremely popular with Europeans.

Belgian Customs documents show that "at least 3000 TOW missiles" were involved in the shell game assembly operation. Chartered cargo planes arriving from the military bases in the U.S. brought in the TOW warheads. Shortly after they taxied to a stop in the Customs area, additional cargos arriving from NATO storehouses in the West German province of Bavaria would pull up alongside, bringing the missile fuselages and the motors. Since the warheads were never offloaded - and thus, never imported into Belgium - they required no Customs documents. The German cargos were labelled "industrial parts," and "motors," and did not arouse the suspicion of Belgian Customs officials. They were simply loaded onto the American charters for the final leg of the journey to Iran. The Brussels daily Le Soir, which reviewed the Customs documents, declared that the whole operation "had the benediction of the Pentagon," and suggested that the TOW deliveries were "the Belgian Irangate" (18).

En:

An International Cartel

Neutral Sweden's involvement in the black market arms trade to Iran was not limited to Bofors. Indeed, one of Iran's most capable arms procurement agents, Karl-Erik Schmitz, masterminded arms deals for Iran worth an estimated $600 million from his base in the Swedish port of Malmö, where he ran Scandinavia Commodities Corporation.black market arms trade to Iran was not limited to Bofors. Indeed, one of Iran's most capable arms procurement agents, Karl-Erik Schmitz, masterminded arms deals for Iran worth an estimated $600 million from his base in the Swedish port of Malmö, where he ran Scandinavia Commodities Corporation.

Schmitz had conducted business with the Shah for more than twenty years by the time Iranian Defense Ministry officials turned to him for help in 1983. Swedish investigators, who interrogated Schmitz at length, agreed that he seemed an unlikely figure to be running a sophisticated black market arms operation. "He was handsome, a family man, extremely polite," they said. "Certainly not the type of person you would imagine dealing in weapons. When asked whether he had any regrets on selling arms used in the Gulf war, Schmitz replied blandly: "The powder factories must be kept going. What else would the workers do?" (24)

Schmitz had conducted business with the Shah for more than twenty years by the time Iranian Defense Ministry officials turned to him for help in 1983. Swedish investigators, who interrogated Schmitz at length, agreed that he seemed an unlikely figure to be running a sophisticated black market arms operation. "He was handsome, a family man, extremely polite," they said. "Certainly not the type of person you would imagine dealing in weapons. When asked whether he had any regrets on selling arms used in the Gulf war, Schmitz replied blandly: "The powder factories must be kept going. What else would the workers do?" (24)

But Schmitz could also be cunning, and extremely cynical. And according to Swedish investigators, he used ever every trick in the black marketeer's book. To help his Danish freighters loaded with gunpowder avoid the scrutiny of the Egyptian authorities while passing through the Suez Canal, he produced fake documents showing they were destined for Kenya. He sold gunpowder from Sweden, Holland and West Germany to Yugoslavia, then bought it back and resold it to Iran. He faked end-use certificates to Pakistan and bills of lading. He sent gunpowder across national borders to be packed into "bullets, bombs, and weapons like that," so all trace of its origin was lost. One of Schmitz's munitions deals, for which the author saw pro-forma invoices and other documents, was worth a whopping $150 million.

And Schmitz was involved in dozens of deals. He was a world-class operator.Schmitz could also be cunning, and extremely cynical. And according to Swedish investigators, he used ever every trick in the black marketeer's book. To help his Danish freighters loaded with gunpowder avoid the scrutiny of the Egyptian authorities while passing through the Suez Canal, he produced fake documents showing they were destined for Kenya. He sold gunpowder from Sweden, Holland and West Germany to Yugoslavia, then bought it back and resold it to Iran. He faked end-use certificates to Pakistan and bills of lading. He sent gunpowder across national borders to be packed into "bullets, bombs, and weapons like that," so all trace of its origin was lost. One of Schmitz's munitions deals, for which the author saw pro-forma invoices and other documents, was worth a whopping $150 million. And Schmitz was involved in dozens of deals. He was a world-class operator.

To satisfy Iran's enormous needs in artillery ammunition, Schmitz first turned to South Africa, whose munitions plants supplied him with the equivalent of 3700 tons of gunpowder. But in June 1984, the South Africans cut off supplies without explanation. In fact, the State-owned Armaments Corporation had just signed a top secret $520 million contract to supply Iraq with long-range artillery pieces. One of the Iraqi conditions was that South Africa stop deliveries to Iran (25).Schmitz first turned to South Africa, whose munitions plants supplied him with the equivalent of 3700 tons of gunpowder. But in June 1984, the South Africans cut off supplies without explanation. In fact, the State-owned Armaments Corporation had just signed a top secret $520 million contract to supply Iraq with long-range artillery pieces. One of the Iraqi conditions was that South Africa stop deliveries to Iran (25).

To make up the shortfall, Schmitz appealed to a little-known cartel of European munitions producers, which had grown out of a seemingly innocent trade organization set up in Brussels in 1975 called the European Association for the Study of Safety Problems in the Production of Propellant Powder (EASSP). According to an EASSP representative in Paris, the group was intended as a forum to share information on safety problems in chemical plants and on international Customs and transportation regulations. Schmitz appealed to a little-known cartel of European munitions producers, which had grown out of a seemingly innocent trade organization set up in Brussels in 1975 called the European Association for the Study of Safety Problems in the Production of Propellant Powder (EASSP). According to an EASSP representative in Paris, the group was intended as a forum to share information on safety problems in chemical plants and on international Customs and transportation regulations.

With the Gulf War broke out, the Association became a convenient cover for a cartel whose sole purpose soon became supplying both Iran and Iraq with munitions. Of the more than fifty original members, by 1981 only thirteen companies remained. But they were among Europe's largest producers of military gunpowder, and included: Nobel Chemie in Sweden, PRB in Belgium, SNPE in France, Nobel Explosives of Scotland, Muiden Chemie in Holland, Forcit and Kemira in Finland, Rio Tinto in Italy, Snia BpD in Italy, Vinnis in Switzerland, and Vass A.G. in West Germany.West Germany.

"Cartel members in Sweden, France, Holland and Belgium would meet regularly to eat and drink together and plan how they would keep Iran and Iraq supplied with munitions," Swedish Customs officials explained. "They knew that no single company could produce enough gunpowder to meet the enormous demand, without raising production quotas and attracting attention. So they decided to spread the work around."

And that was how it worked. During those long business lunches in Paris, Madrid, Geneva, and Brugges, cartel members would sit down and portion out the monthly gunpowder needs of Iran and Iraq. Ten percent might go to a firm in Sweden, twenty percent to France, another ten percent each to Holland, Finland and Belgium. And Schmitz would sit in the middle with his fingers on the Iranian bank accounts. Western intelligence specialists estimate that during the months of intensive fighting, Iraq and Iran consume nearly half a million heavy artillery shells each. That's more than ten times the yearly consumption of most major European armies (26). Swedish deliveries alone sometimes amounted to 400 tons per year, or half of Sweden's yearly production of military explosives.Schmitz would sit in the middle with his fingers on the Iranian bank accounts. Western intelligence specialists estimate that during the months of intensive fighting, Iraq and Iran consume nearly half a million heavy artillery shells each. That's more than ten times the yearly consumption of most major European armies (26). Swedish deliveries alone sometimes amounted to 400 tons per year, or half of Sweden's yearly production of military explosives.

The cartel was first cracked in November 1984, when Swedish Customs raided the headquarters of Nobel Chemie after getting wind of a suspicious gunpowder shipment that had criss-crossed West Germany on its way to Syria the month before. "We saw found of correspondence between Nobel and Iran," one investigator said. "So we made another raid, and discovered a real mess." The cartel was next surprised in action in December 1985, when Swedish Customs intercepted a twenty-six ton shipment of Nobel Chemie gunpowder en route from the port of Trelleborg to East Germany, where it was to be packed into munitions by the IMIS company before leaving Rostock directly for Iran.West Germany on its way to Syria the month before. "We saw found of correspondence between Nobel and Iran," one investigator said. "So we made another raid, and discovered a real mess." The cartel was next surprised in action in December 1985, when Swedish Customs intercepted a twenty-six ton shipment of Nobel Chemie gunpowder en route from the port of Trelleborg to East Germany, where it was to be packed into munitions by the IMIS company before leaving Rostock directly for Iran.

But the Customs investigators were not empowered to stop cartel agent, Karl-Erik Schmitz, from engaging in black market arms smuggling. Indeed, once they quietly put a stop to Swedish gunpowder deliveries to Iran in 1986, "Schmitz went to every corner of Europe and elsewhere desperately seeking new suppliers," officials said. "He went to Holland, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece - and especially, to Israel. He had to continue these deals to avoid financial ruin, because he had posted performance bonds for 5-10% of the total value of his contracts."Schmitz, from engaging in black market arms smuggling. Indeed, once they quietly put a stop to Swedish gunpowder deliveries to Iran in 1986, "Schmitz went to every corner of Europe and elsewhere desperately seeking new suppliers," officials said. "He went to Holland, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece - and especially, to Israel. He had to continue these deals to avoid financial ruin, because he had posted performance bonds for 5-10% of the total value of his contracts."

Schmitz himself remained unperturbed by the Customs investigation, even though he could face criminal prosecution. "After all," Schmitz said in 1987, "there are so many things you can sell the Iranians."Schmitz himself remained unperturbed by the Customs investigation, even though he could face criminal prosecution. "After all," Schmitz said in 1987, "there are so many things you can sell the Iranians."

To Richard Fairbanks, the gunpowder club "sounded like something out of a novel." Unfortunately, for the more than one million dead on both sides of the front, the thirteen munitions manufacturers who formed the cartel were real, and their primary mission was to fan the flames of the Gulf war."

Meer » www.network54.com

De waarheid schaadt nooit een zaak die rechtvaardig is.

Als die info van de Zweedse tipgever(s) waarde heeft (wat ik toch heel sterk vermoed) en de huurling was er bij in Anderlues en hij gebruikt een .357, is de kans heel groot dat hij ook een mededader was in Genval en Nijvel, waar ook een .357 gebruikt is. Waarbij ik ook de bedenking maak dat die huurling ook in andere Zuid-Amerikaanse landen actief was buiten Brazilië.

Als hij ook betrokken is bij de overval in Verviers dan is de bende Haemers en Ciolini niet veraf. Ook is de kans heel groot dat hij 1 van de huurlingen is die in Bolivia actief was. Dan hij zou wel eens betrokken kunnen zijn bij de aanslagen op Franse doelen, zeker omdat er een verwijzing is naar RAF en AD. De springstof die gebruikt is in Verviers door Haemers is dezelfde als gebruikt door RAF en AD.

Het zou veel kunnen verklaren en dan is de kans ook groot dat hij in relatie stond met Lekeu en Guy Van Vinck in die periode en spreekt Louvaert dus de waarheid en is hij waarschijnlijk één van de daders in Ohain?

De waarheid schaadt nooit een zaak die rechtvaardig is.

Correctie op de post hierboven: het is dezelfde springstof die de CCC en AD gebruikten, wat het nog interessanter maakt i.v.m. de rustpauze van de bende.

De waarheid schaadt nooit een zaak die rechtvaardig is.
fipilip wrote:

'Wapenhandelaar' Jean-Claude Darville woonde op de Louizalaan 399. Op de Louizalaan 391 was de zetel van Rossair gevestigd, eigendom van 'wapenhandelaar' Rossignol.

Wel wel wel. Van Rossignol komt zo bij Ohain. En er lopen op de een of andere manier steeds sporen of linken over De Pomp. Ook Oostende en omgeving zijn voor die huurling(en) mogelijk belangrijk.

De waarheid schaadt nooit een zaak die rechtvaardig is.
the end wrote:

Dus een tipgever belt naar de Zweedse ambassade en die persoon heeft een huurling ontmoet op 1 november '85. De huurling zou mee achter de aanslagen van de Bende van Nijvel zitten.

Die datum van het contact van de getuige en die huurling heb ik altijd interessant gevonden. Dit doet me denken aan een samenkomst om gesneuvelde makkers te herdenken of zoiets. En huurlingen, dan is Zaïre niet ver weg plus dat die bepaalde huurling ook goed thuis is in Zuid-Amerika. Het is ook dat de eerste lichting Diane-leden uit de para's kwamen met hoogst waarschijnlijk een Zaïre-link. Met ook namen als Guy Van Vinck en Lekeu en lid van de Golden Eagle, is de kans heel groot dat er overlappingen zijn.

De waarheid schaadt nooit een zaak die rechtvaardig is.
the end wrote:

Als die info van de Zweedse tipgever(s) waarde heeft (wat ik toch heel sterk vermoed) en de huurling was er bij in Anderlues en hij gebruikt een .357, is de kans heel groot dat hij ook een mededader was in Genval en Nijvel, waar ook een .357 gebruikt is. Waarbij ik ook de bedenking maak dat die huurling ook in andere Zuid-Amerikaanse landen actief was buiten Brazilië.

Als hij ook betrokken is bij de overval in Verviers dan is de bende Haemers en Ciolini niet veraf. Ook is de kans heel groot dat hij 1 van de huurlingen is die in Bolivia actief was. Dan hij zou wel eens betrokken kunnen zijn bij de aanslagen op Franse doelen, zeker omdat er een verwijzing is naar RAF en AD. De springstof die gebruikt is in Verviers door Haemers is dezelfde als gebruikt door RAF en AD.

Het zou veel kunnen verklaren en dan is de kans ook groot dat hij in relatie stond met Lekeu en Guy Van Vinck in die periode en spreekt Louvaert dus de waarheid en is hij waarschijnlijk één van de daders in Ohain?

Dit topic, en bovenstaande logica wordt ondersteund door verschillende andere elementen. Het dossier Mendez is er belangrijk bij. Die Zweedse bron staat in relatie met het onderzoek naar de moord op Mendez, in die context komt de bende en Darville in beeld. Via Mendez lopen er nog bijzondere sporen naar bovenstaande. Mendez was ten eerste zeer bezorgd over de wapens die de bende gebruikt zou hebben. Waar het zal gaan over het gebruik van de bij de Diane gestolen wapens, want van deze zijn er door "zijn handen" gegaan.

Het opmerkelijk ivm de wapens en Mendez is dat er een FAL van Mendez bij de bende Haemers gevonden is. Tevens is de springstof die de bende Heamers gebruikte dezelfde als die van de CCC. Erbij zijn wapens van de diefstal in Vielsam (1984) bij de CCC gevonden.

De waarheid schaadt nooit een zaak die rechtvaardig is.

the end: Dank je wel, smile

19

Het lijkt er bijna op als zou er ergens een illegaal wapenmagazijn bestaan waar gangsters kunnen gaan "shoppen"!

20

Als ik mij niet vergis beweert Bouten dat ook dat er een illegaal depot is waar ze konden wapens huren.