In diezelfde Terrorism Review van 2 december 1985 staat nog een artikel met als titel 'Belgium: Coping with terrorism'. Hieronder het volledige artikel: 

Belgium, once relatively untouched by the terrorist phenomenon, now finds itself increasingly vulnerable because of its open borders, large number of attractive international targets, and the appearance of indigenous terrorist groups during the past year. A national counterterrorist boy [de Anti-Terroristische Gemengde Groep], championed by Minister of Justice Jean Gol, was established in September 1984, but a lack of training and experience, continuing interservice rivalries, and austere budgets will impede Belgium’s counterterrorist efforts.

Terrorism: Foreign and Domestic

Belgium historically has served as a supply base and sanctuary for terrorist groups from all corners of Europe. Foreign terrorists transit Belgium with ease. The border with France alone has 600 crossing points, only 40 of which are checked by police. The Spanish Basque separatist organization Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) created an infrastructure in Belgium in the 1960s and received open support from some extremist movements. More than 100 sympathizers attended the trial of four ETA members in 1983, and, according to ETA, the powerful bomb that extensively damaged the Palace of Justice in Antwerp was its retaliation for the extradition of two of the four to Spain.

[Meer info over die bomaanslag in Antwerpen vind je in het topic Operatie ETA » Forum]

As host to numerous exiles, particularly Albanians and Yugoslavs, as well as a growing Middle Eastern community, Belgium has been the venue of violent activity in the past. The Provisional Irish Republican Army carried out bombings in 1978 and 1979; the West German Red Army Faction attempted to blow up NATO Supreme Commander Haig’s car in 1979; Palestinian guerrillas tried to seize an Israeli airplane at Brussels airport the same year; and an Armenian group claimed responsibility for the murder of a Turkish attache in 1982, Gol pushed for a central policymaking group - the Antiterrorist College - to collect intelligence and combat terrorism. Two years of study and negotiations on the complicated and politically sensitive organizational and control aspects of the College preceded the signing of protocols among the various police and security services.

Despite this progress, the Belgians were not fully prepared to deal with the series of bombings begun in October 1984 by the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC), a domestic group, which emerged during the heated debated on Intermediate Nuclear Force deployment. The CCC initially attacked NATO facilities and foreign subsidiaries of defense-related businesses initially, but the group recently has broadened its targets to include domestic companies, banks, and even the pacifist movement. Two other Belgian-based organizations, the Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action (FRAP) and a radical environmental group, the Peace Conquerors, have also claimed credit for bombings. The nation’s counterterrorist units have also had to deal with mindless criminal violence committed (*) by a gang - nicknamed the Crazy Brabant Killers - which has robbed supermarkets and killed bystanders indiscriminately, as many as seven at a time.

(*) In het topic over de CIA heb ik al aangegeven dat het vreemd is dat de CIA de feiten van de Bende van Nijvel zonder meer beschouwd als criminele feiten.

Failures and successes

Pas performance by Belgian authorities has not been impressive, and such breakthroughs as have occurred have been fortuitous:

• Pamphlets prepared by a Belgian printer, Pierre Carette, for the French terrorist group Action Directe (AD) in 1982 were discovered only after the car delivering them had an accident on the Brussels-Paris expressway.

• Operation Mammoth, a major counterterrorist effort launched with much fanfare in the fall of 1984, yielded few concrete results, despite more than 120 searches by hundred of police officers.

• In march 1984 several AD leaders evaded arrest despite surveillance by the Judiciary Police for several days.

• In June 1985 the Gendarmerie surprised a group digging up weapons near Leuven, but the detainees were later released because of a lack of evidence tying them to a terrorist group.

Even successful antiterrorist operations often reveal police clumsiness. In a major succes this summer, Belgian authorities discovered several apartments in the Brussels suburbs linked to the FRAP. Searches of the apartments yielded components for manufacturing bombs, money, weapons, false identification cards, and terrorist literature. During the several weeks in which police shadowed suspected FRAP member Chantal Paternostre, however, she and her husband copied down the license numbers of more than 30 undercover vehicles that followed them. Most of these belonged to the Group Diane, considered the country’s elite counterterrorist unit. Following her arrest, she has not cooperated with police and is unlikely to do so because the judicial system makes no provision for plea bargaining.

Expanded Cooperation

Brussels has displayed some interest in exchanging information with other countries. West Germany and France, for example, drew Belgium into cooperative efforts in February when they agreed to form a joint operational working group to intensify police and intelligence exchanges. The Belgian Interforces Antiterrorist Group (GIA), the German Federal Police (BKA), and the individual French services plan to establish a direct secure communication link for exchanging information pertaining to the Red Army Faction, Action Directe, and the CCC. [hierna volgt een kort gecensureerd stuk]

Foreing Minister Tindemans also stressed international cooperation. During Vice President Bush’s visit in June, Tindemans pointed out that the Belgian Parliament had just approved a plan to work within the Council of Europe against terrorism. In his UN speech in September, Tindemans also urged countries to seek agreement on what acts constitute terrorism and to take some universally recognized measures to combat them.

Outlook Mixed

In a period of economic austerity, Brussels, until recently, devoted few resources to counterterrorist efforts. Between 1976 and 1983, the security budget did not increase as a share of GNP. Last fall, however, funds for security forces were augmented substantially, and money was earmarked to automate files of the State Security Service, establish a Senior Police Institute, and equip and train regional Gendarmerie special intervention units. These units are scheduled to be fully trained by late 1986 and will be responsive to tasking from both the GIA and the Gendarmerie. In addition, Brussels has authorized an increase in the strength of the Gendarmerie to nearly 17.000 by the end of 1986.

Rivalry among and within Belgium’s various security services is rampant and obstructs the sharing of information. The services have been known to conduct investigations independently and refuse to share evidence or leads. Different functional responsibilities between the Gendarmerie and the State Security Service also restrict cooperation. The Gendarmerie is primarily a paramilitary organization with law and order functions, [gecensureerd].

The lack of a clearly defined chained of command will continue to create problems. Four different police forces answer to three different ministeries. The Gendarmerie, for example, is tasked by the Ministry of Defense but also assists the Ministries of Interior and Justice. A study group is exploring the question of command structure, but this is likely to be a lengthy process.

As bombings by the CCC and criminal violence continue unchecked, public anxiety is mounting. The government has announced measures to increase the coordination of police forces and to improve counterterrorist training. Justice Minister Gol is considering the formation of an as yet undefined "super police". The death penalty, which has not been applied since 1984, is again under discussion

Despite the formation of the new Antiterrorist College and expanded counterterrorist cooperation, financial and personnel limitations and the inexperience of the newly formed GIA do not augur well for immediate results. For the time being, Belgium’s response to terrorism is likely to be reactive rather than anticipatory, but public pressure should ensure continued focus on the problem.

Bron: CIA Terrorism Review | 2 December 1985